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Personal Property Exemptions and the Uniform 
Exemptions Act 
At common law, debtor exemptions were rarely reco'gnized 
and, generally speaking, every species of a debtor's property was 
subject to execution for the payment of a debt.' American legisla- 
tures, however, have had more compassion for the judgment 
debtor than did the common law. In an effort to protect a portion 
of the debtor's holdings, every state has passed personal property 
exemption statutes. These statutes are by no means uniform; 
even a brief overview reveals broad differences in construction, 
emphasis, and items e~empted .~  
In response to this diversity and in an attempt to correct the 
inherent flaws in existing state exemption laws, "most of which 
are archaic, some of which are unduly generous, and some of 
which are extremely niggardl~,"~ the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed the Uniform 
Exemptions Act. The Uniform Exemptions Act proposes, as an 
alternative to the morass of divergent state laws, a single schedule 
of exemptions to be applied to all debtors. Several of its sections 
apply specifically to personal property exemptions. 
After presenting some background observations about the 
scope and purpose of personalty exemptions, this Comment will 
examine the flaws of existing exemption statutes. An analysis of 
the Uniform Exemptions Act as an attempt to rectify those flaws 
will follow. Finally, this Comment will suggest modifications 
states might consider in adopting the Uniform Exemptions Act. 
A. Scope of Personal Property Exemption Law 
An exemption from execution has been defined as a debtor's 
legal right to retain a portion of his personal property, free from 
1. Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 4, 154 N.E. 748, 749 (1926). 
2. Yale Law Journal sent questionnaires to 104 district court clerks requesting data 
concerning the status of those claiming exemptions, the type of claims, and the average 
value of the state exemption claimed by bankruptcy candidates. The results indicate a 
surprising degree, of diversity in state exemption law. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: 
Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1504-07, 1515-16 (1959). See also 52 K Y .  L.J. 
456 (1964). 
3. COMM~SSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1973). 
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"seizure and sale under legal process for the payment of [his] 
 debt^."^ In other words, when a debt is created, the creditor does 
not look and has no right to look to exempt property as a means 
of payment .5 
It is essential to acknowledge initially that personal property 
exemption law does not exist in a vacuum. It is integrally related 
to, yet apart from, bankruptcy proceedings, debtor-creditor rela- 
tionships, and coexistent exemption statutes. A brief overview of 
these related areas will help to clarify the scope of personal prop- 
erty exemption law. 
1. Bankruptcy and state personalty exemption law 
Although both bankruptcy and state exemption law offer 
relief to the improvident and impecunious, there are several fac- 
tors which indicate that the two procedures are in fact different 
and should be treated as such. The first and most obvious consid- 
eration is that bankruptcy is a federal proceeding, whereas ex- 
emption law lies within the state's special domain.Wut, despite 
a proposed Bankruptcy Act that would establish a policy afford- 
ing all debtors the same exemption rights,' the existing Bank- 
ruptcy Act provides that it "shall not affect the allowance to 
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed . . . by the 
State laws in force a t  the time of the filing of the [bankruptcy] 
petition in the State" of domi~i le .~ Thus, even though bankruptcy 
proceedings are handled by federal courts and are subject to uni- 
form congressional enactment, a t  present, substantive state ex- 
emption law is applied in most bankruptcy cases. 
A second consideration demonstrating the diversity between 
bankruptcy and exemption law is the fact that the procedures 
involved in exemption and bankruptcy actions are different. One 
procedural difference is that state exemption statutes protect 
4. Clark v. Nirembaum, 8 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1925) cert. denied, Powell v. Ander- 
son, 270 U.S. 649 (1926). 
5. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875). 
6. The historical interplay between the two illustrates an interesting lesson in federal- 
ism and points out the conflicting interests that still exist. The Constitution grants Con- 
gress the authority to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, 8 8, cl. 4. In accordance with this power, Congress 
passed bankruptcy acts in 1800 and 1841 that contained exemption provisions. The Bank- 
ruptcy Act of 1898, still in force today, however, incorporates the exemption laws of the 
appropriate state. The Supreme Court upheld this reference to nonuniform state exemp- 
tion law against a challenge that it breached the "uniform Laws" requirements of article 
one. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). 
7. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
8. 11 U.S.C. 8 24 (1970). 
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debtors only temporarily from the collection efforts of their credi- 
tors by postponing payment of the debt, while bankruptcy per- 
manently terminates the creditor's claim and, following dis- 
charge, grants the debtor a fresh start? Another dissimilarity is 
tha t  bankruptcy requires a total liquidation of the debtor's 
nonexempt assets whereas state exemption law does not. These 
differences may combine to justify a greater exemption allowance 
under exemption statutes than bankruptcy proceedings since a 
debtor whose obligation to repay has been postponed through 
reliance on an exemption is more likely to rehabilitate his debt 
than one whose debt has been cancelled through discharge in 
bankruptcy. Thus, given a greater exemption allowance under 
state law, a debtor may forego bankruptcy and use his exempt 
property to produce income to rehabilitate the debt.1° 
2. Deb tor-creditor relationship 
The two categories of creditors most affected by exemption 
statutes are unsecured contract creditors and tort victims who 
have obtained judgments. Obviously, the debtors who will typi- 
cally rely on exemption statutes are those who face possible exe- 
cution against their property because of an inability to pay their 
debt. However, there may be any number of reasons for the 
9. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). 
Williams was one of the first cases to state that "the one purpose of the Bankruptcy Act 
was to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit 
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business 
misfortunes." Id. 
10. The assumption that exemption of occupationally related personalty would ena- 
ble the debtor to provide for his immediate needs and ultimately to rehabilitate his debt 
is supported by Cleveland Arcade Co. v. Talcott, 22 Ohio App. 516, 154 N.E. 62 (1926), 
where the court recognized that execution against a lawyer-debtor's library and office 
furniture would "deprive the creditor of the very sources of production which would result 
in the payment of indebtedness." Id. at  517, 154 N.E. at  63. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 
128 (1972), also lends support to the above assumption by analogy. In the area of wage 
garnishment the Court noted that the indigent debtor will find "limited incentive to seek 
legitimate employment when . . . [he] knows that his wages will be garnished without 
the benefit of the customary exemptions." Id. at  139. 
A statement by the National Conference, however, may lead to a different conclusion, 
i.e., that liberal exemption laws may prompt debtors to resort to bankruptcy: 
The existence of discrepancies between the exemptions available under the 
Bankruptcy Act and those provided by state law would furnish an incentive for 
the invocation of relief under the Act; if the federal exemptions are more gener- 
ous, a debtor will be encouraged to file a petition under the Act to obtain the 
enlarged benefits i t  affords against his creditors; if the federal exemptions are 
less liberal, creditors may be persuaded to precipitate involuntary bankruptcy 
in order to reach property not leviable under state law. 
UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note at 7. 
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debtor's inability to pay-improvidence, sudden medical emer- 
gencies, or loss of a job, to name a few. 
Whether it is desirable to undercut the financial expectations 
of creditors to safeguard a debtor from total liquidation, therefore 
subjecting the creditor to a loss, is a frequently raised question. 
The answer would appear to depend on the basis of the creditor's 
interest. For example, while contract creditors have an opportun- 
ity to select their debtors and extend credit in light of exemption 
law, l tort victims have no such opportunity. l2 Moreover, assump- 
tion of risk is an element of the creditor's business that is reflected 
in his interest rates;13 it is not a factor in tort judgments. There- 
fore, while it would be unfair to penalize a tort victim through 
operation of exemption statutes, it is not as unfair to require the 
contract creditor to share the burden of his debtor's financial 
distress. 
3. Personal property and coexistent exemption law 
Personal property exemptions are only one part of a complex 
exemption picture. Other exemption statutes, which include ex- 
emptions for homesteads,14 wages,15 and the proceeds from welfare 
funds and insurance policies,16 are also part of the panorama of 
exemption law. As a result, reference to these other exemption 
laws is necessary to understand exemptions in their totality. The 
views and proposals of this Comment, then, should not be read 
in isolation, but rather in connection with other relevant exemp- 
tion procedures. With the scope of exemption law in mind, it is 
possible to analyze the concepts and policies upon which personal 
property exemption law is founded. 
11. See Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445,450 
( 1960). 
12. In early cases some courts refused to allow exemptions against tort claims, reason- 
ing that such claims are not contemplated within the meaning of "debt." See, e.g., Erlen- 
bach v. Cox, 206 Ala. 298, 89 So. 465 (1921); Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 
(1936). See also 25 MINN. L. REV. 66, 77-78 (1940). But see UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT § 
l (1)  (defining "debt" as "a legally enforceable monetary obligation or liability of an 
individual, whether arising out of contract, tort, or otherwise"). 
13. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969). 
14. See generally Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950). 
15. See generally Abrahams & Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from Garnish- 
ment: Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 153 (1954). 
16. See generally Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 807-13, 
820-21 (1974). 
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B. The Purpose of Exemption Law 
The purpose of exemption statutes has often been declared 
by the Supreme Court, state legislatures, and state courts. In the 
leading case of Bronson v. Kinzie,17 Chief Justice Taney .stated 
that exemption law is intended "to secure [debtors] from unjust 
and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits 
which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every com- 
munity."18 That the purpose of exemption law is founded on in- 
interests of humanity and generosity is reinforced as being "for 
the protection and benefit of a poor debtor and his helpless fam- 
ily, to give them the bread of life, and a pillow whereon to lay the 
head, to save them from destitution and absolute want."lg Thus, 
there are three intended beneficiaries of exemption law: the 
debtor,20 the debtor's family,21 and the debtor's c o m m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  
The purpose of exemption law can be more fully understood 
after a consideration of the emotional and economic considera- 
tions underlying exemption statutes. Also, in addition to humani- 
tarian concern for the debtor, the economic rights of creditors 
must also be considered and the conflicting interests of the debtor 
and creditor carefully weighed. A consideration of these factors 
follows. 
I .  Emotional and economic considerations 
Traditionally the debtor has been subject to harsh treatment 
and severe disciplinary penalties. Imprisonment for debt and 
other oppressive measures were known in Roman law,23 and were 
17. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843). 
18. Id. at 315-16. A similar statement amplifying the purpose of exemptions is found 
in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940): "[Tjhe usual purpose of 
exemptions is to relieve the person exempted from the pressure of claims hostile to his 
dependents' essential needs as well as his personal ones . . . ." 
19. State v. Allen, 48 W. Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E. 990, 993 (1900). 
20. See Michigan Pub. School Employees' Retirement Bd. v. Peterson, 39 Mich. App. 
568, 197 N.W.2d 854 (1972); State v. Monaco, 81 N.J. Super. 448, 195 A.2d 910 (1963). 
21. See Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Anderson v. Cana- 
day, 37 Okla. 171, 175, 131 P. 697, 699 (1913). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (1975); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 4 24-5-1 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1977)(each providing 
special exemption treatment for heads of families). 
22. See Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash. 179, 182, 86 P. 392, 394 (1906). 
23. Roman law provided that if a debt remained unpaid for a certain period of time 
"the debtor might be killed or sold into slavery, and competing creditors might divide the 
body into pieces proportionate to the amount of each one's claim." Ford, Imprisonment 
for Debt, .25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 24-25 (1926). 
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utilized by the early English common law courts.24 Even though 
colonial insolvency acts recognized humanitarian  objective^,^^ 
America was not free from similar harsh measures. 
[lTjhe high incidence of default in the generation after the Rev- 
olution made the debtors' prison a visibly obnoxious feature of 
American life. The poor were the chief victims. About sixty per 
cent of the prisoners owed no more than ten dollars. . . . In 
some cases confinement dragged on for years, and inevitably 
there were instances of the grossest inhumanity-nursing moth- 
ers deprived of their liberty, aged Revolutionary veterans jailed 
for trifling amounts, prisoners crowded into tiny, foul cells, and 
cases of exploitation, brutality, and death.26 
It was against this historical backdrop that alternative mea- 
sures for treating insolvents evolved.27 "[Tlhe person, then the 
personal property, and finally the real estate were freed from 
control of the creditor through the abolition of imprisonment for 
debt, the extension of chattel exemptions and the adoption of the 
homestead exemption, with  limitation^."^^ The repugnancy of 
imprisonment for debt unmistakably stands as an initial step 
toward the enactment of exemption statutes. This repugnancy 
advances a strong emotional argument in favor of exemption stat- 
utes, but there has long existed an economic as well as an emo- 
tional concern supporting the enactment of such statutes. 
As early as A.D. 321, Emperor Constantine prohibited his tax 
24. The common law was a t  one time very harsh toward the recalcitrant debtor. One 
early common law judge issued the following invective: 
If a man be taken in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the plaintiff 
a t  whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who took him, is bound to find him 
meat, drink, or clothes; but he must live on his own, or on the charity of others: 
and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name of God, says the law; 
and so say I. 
Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex. 1659) (footnote omitted). See generally Note, 
Present Status of Execution Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IOWA L. REV. 
306, 306-07 (1957). 
25. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 13 (1974). 
26. Id. at  254. An equally strong statement denouncing the harsh practice of impris- 
onment for debt was issued by the Supreme Court. 
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. . . . It breaks the 
spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and 
dooms him, while i t  lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it is the 
opposite of remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when such a blot is 
, 
removed from the statute-book. 
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 602 (1877) (citation omitted). 
27. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50 (interpretative commentary describes the evolution of 
exemption law in Texas jurisprudence). 
28. 1018-3rd Street v. Texas, 331 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). 
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collectors from seizing "slaves, oxen, or implements used for the 
cultivation of the soil . . . by which act the payment of taxes may 
be delayed."29 Thus, the desire to maintain a constant source of 
tax revenue was recognized in ancient Rome as a justification for 
exempting occupationally related property of debtors from sei- 
zure. Similar economic justifications emerged in common law 
England," but, it was not until 1845 that benevolence prevailed 
over creditors' interests. In that year, the Small Debt Act was 
enacted "to protect the actual necessaries" of the debtor from 
execution.31 
The modern American counterparts of England's first ex- 
emption statutes recognize the practical economic aspects of ex- 
emption provisions and also square economic practicality with 
humanity. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones32 illustrates 
the delicate balancing required if economic reality and humani- 
tarian interests are to be merged. In the Hollywood decision the 
court stated: 
[Exemption] laws are passed not only for protection of low 
income families, but also for the protection of the community 
at  large. They are designed to give assurance that the wage 
earner shall always have enough, beyond the reach of attaching 
creditors, to support his family and to prevent them from be- 
coming public charges.33 
2. Balancing debtor and creditor interests 
Although modern courts have been quick to extend protec- 
tion to the debtor, it must be conceded that creditors do have just 
and enforceable rights against the debtor. The importance of the 
creditor's rights, although often overlooked, has been well ex- 
pressed. 
Notwithstanding the benevolent provisions of the statute . . . 
[clreditors are still recognised as having some rights . . . . It 
29. 14 JUSTINIAN, THE CIVIL LAW 263 (S. Scott trans. 1932). 
30. See, e.g., Sunbolf v. Alford, 150 Eng. Rep. 1135 (Ex. 1838) (holding that a man's 
clothing could not be seized from his person to satisfy a debt); Hutchins v. Chambers, 97 
Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1758) (holding that an exemption existed for the tools, utensils, and 
animals by which the debtor earned his livelihood. The common law court apparently 
reasoned that to seize these possessions would be to deprive the debtor of the means 
necessary to rehabilitate the debt). 
31. Small Debts Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 127, § 8. The "actual necessaries" were 
construed to include only bedding, wearing apparel, and tools of trade not to exceed the 
pittance of five pounds sterling. 
32. 117 A.2d 226 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955). 
33. Id. a t  227. 
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frequently happens that the creditor is more in need of public 
sympathy than the debtor. When a poor man is unjustly kept 
out of money due to him, the distress arising from the want of 
it is often greater than that caused to the other party by its 
collection. If the suffering was but equal, it  is plain that one man 
should not suffer for the follies or misfortunes of another. Every 
one should bear his own b ~ r t h e n . ~ ~  
It therefore becomes apparent that the scales weighing jus- 
tice for the creditor on the one hand and mercy for the debtor on 
the other require careful balancing. Simply stated, to severely 
burden a debtor is to invite the emotional and economic argu- 
ments voiced above, yet to deny a creditor his just due is equally 
onerous. 35 
Historical, economic, and emotional considerations consti- 
tute a portion of the crucible in which the need, justification, and 
purpose for exemption law were formed. These factors are still 
potent and state legislatures and national committees must con- 
tinue to take them into account when weighing the conflicting 
interests of the debtor and creditor when drafting appropriate 
legi~lation.~' 
The contention of several commentators and the thrust of the 
Uniform Exemptions Act is that the deference given the exemp- 
tion enactments of the several states has resulted in gross diver- 
34. Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. 93,94-95 (1854). This quotation is used not to overstate 
the creditor's case, but rather to suggest that the relative welfare of the parties may be 
part of the delicate balancing mechanism. 
35. The balance between debtor and creditor interests is, however, extremely com- 
plex, due in part to the economic, historical, and political "anvil" upon which the state 
exemption laws were formed and fashioned, see Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique 
and Suggestions, 168 YALE L.J. 1459, 1463 (1959), the states' interest in providing for the 
welfare of their constituencies, see, e.g., Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So.2d 792, 794 (Fla. 19541, 
and the public's demand for free availability of credit, see generally Kennedy, Limitation 
of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 450 (1960). 
36. That state legislatures are sensitive to conflicting interests and to the injustice 
that can result if one interest is weighed more heavily than the other is borne out by an 
official committee comment to the Michigan personal property exemption statute. In 
explaining why it increased the tools of the trade exemption from $350 to $1000, the 
committee stated: 
With prices as they are today, it is difficult to see how a person could 
continue in business while keeping less than $1,000 of his stock or equipment. 
Of course, the amount will vary, but it is felt that $1,000 will tend to save the 
"little" man, and still subject those with larger businesses to payment of their 
debts. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. Q 600.6023 (1968) (Comment 5). 
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sity and major flaws. The most frequently raised criticisms are 
the statutes' lack of uniformity, their archaic nature and their 
unfortunate drafting." 
A. Lack of Uniformity 
Even a quick glance at the state codes reveals that exemption 
law today is a crazy quilt of statutes reflecting influences based 
on dominant state indus t r ie~ ,~~ rising property values,39 and diver- 
sification of occupational trends40 within the individual states. 
Observers of state exemption law, many of whom are "astounded 
by the enormous disparity, contend the disparity is unsatisfac- 
tory because: (1) decisions to move or stay within a state may be 
influenced by the amount of the exemption offered, (2) applica- 
tion of different standards between the several states may subject 
legitimate debts to increased jeopardy, and (3) fragmented ex- 
emption policy may impose an undue burden on interstate credit. 
Many, therefore, conclude that exemption law should be gov- 
erned by a single uniform system.42 
B. 0 bsolescence 
Several commentators have accurately demonstrated that 
many of the state exemption statutes are badly in need of re- 
formeu Rising property values, a higher standard of living, and 
inflationary spirals all combine to make even the most recently 
revised statutes outmoded.44 Although some state legislatures 
37. See, e.g., UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note at 7; Note, Bankruptcy Ex- 
emptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18002, 53 CORNELL . REV. 663, 665-70 (1968). 
38. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, 8 34 (West 1959) (exempting fishing boats and 
equipment); NEV. REV. STAT. 8 21.090(e)(l) (1977) (exempting mining equipment). 
39. CAI,. CIV. CODE 8 1260 (West 1954 & Supp. 1977) (homestead exemption increased 
from $12,500 to $30,000 for head of family and from $5,000 to $15,000 for others); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 52, 8 1 (Smith-Hurd 1967 & Supp. 1977) (homestead exemption increased from 
$5,000 to $10,000). 
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 8 33-1130(3) (Supp. 1974) (camping outfit of a prospector, in- 
cluding mining tools, saddle, and burro, exempted). 
41. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note a t  8. 
42. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note a t  7; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: 
A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18002, 53 CORNELL . REV. 663, 665-70 (1968). 
43. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18008, 53 
CORNELL . REV. 663 (1968); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 
YALE L.J. 1459 (1959). 
44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 33-1124 (West 1974) (two horses or two mules 
and their harnesses); Miss. CODE ANN. 8 85-3-1 (1972) (two work horses or mules and one 
yoke of oxen). 
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have responded to the cry for reform,45 the majority still lags 
behind. 
This problem of obsolescence is not new to exemption law. 
Nearly three decades ago one federal judge sharply criticized a 
state statute, declaring that certain sections literally went "back 
to the yoke of oxen days."46 The judge urged that "[tlhe entire 
section should be forthwith modernized, fairly as to the various 
classifications, with a factual appreciation of present-day times, 
needs and values."47 Sadly enough, it is this urgent need for a 
"factual appreciation of present-day times" that still plagues 
modern exemption law. 
C .  Problems in Statutory Structure 
Modern exemption statutes are flawed not only by references 
to wagons, carriages, and yokes of oxen-indicia of gross obsoles- 
cence-but also by inept statutory structure.48 The methodology 
of a majority of state enactments falls within one of three general 
approaches: specific enumeration, restricted selection from speci- 
fied categories, or open-ended exemption based on nece~s i ty .~~  
Each of these categories suffers from its own particular ailments. 
In the following evaluation of the effectiveness of the statutes 
within each category, particular attention will be given to the 
manner in which the type of exemption employed is able to meet 
the conflicting interests of the debtor and creditor. 
1.  Specific enumeration 
Many personal property exemption statutes endeavor to list 
specific items a judgment debtor can withhold from execution. 
Typical examples of specifically enumerated items are the family 
Bible, a church pew, a burial lot, and wearing apparel? This type 
of statute is desirable in that it provides the debtor and creditor 
with a maximum degree of certainty-both know exactly what is 
45. See Trost, Recent Developments in Debtor Botection: New Exemption Laws, 46 
CAL. ST. B.J. 639 (1971). 
46. In re Rash, 81 F .  Supp. 389, 394 (W.D. Wash. 1948). 
47. Id. 
48. These twin flaws of obsolescence and poor statutory structure are common to both 
the specific-enumeration and restricted-selection-from-specified-categories approaches. 
49. Similar categories have been previously enumerated by several commentators. 
See generally 52 KY. L.J. 456, 457 (1964); 74 W. VA. L. REV. 370, 370 (1971). 
50. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52 4 13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
4 60-2304(1), (4) (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 4 4401(2)-(4) (West 1964 & Supp. 
1977). 
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to be excluded should a judgment be rendered against the debtor. 
Specific enumeration, however, fails to grant the debtor the 
flexibility necessary to meet his individual needs. For example, 
although the specifically itemized exemption may have been nec- 
essary a t  the time the legislation was passed, its utility may have 
become obsolete, or another item, not within the exemption, may 
have taken its place as a household ne~essity.~'  It is no comfort 
in such circumstances for the debtor to be able to exclude an item 
that has no practical value. Despite the efforts of a conscientious 
legislature, therefore, enactments which list items of marginal 
necessity are soon outdated and, as a result, fail to accurately 
reflect a debtor's immediate needs. 
2. Restricted selection from specified categories 
Several statutes allow the judgment debtor to select which 
of his holdings within a specified category will be exempt up to a 
certain monetary limit. Common examples are "[t]ools of his 
occupation to  the  value of six hundred dollars"52 and 
"[h]ousehold furniture not exceeding two hundred dollars in 
value. "53 
Allowing the debtor to select the items most valuable to his 
family a t  a given time is a major advantage of this type of statute. 
Another desirable feature is that the fixed amount, although per- 
ennially and notoriously low, gives the parties a definite indica- 
tion of the type and value of personalty that can be withheld. 
Unfortunately, however, the areas in which selection is al- 
lowed are often very narrowly p r e s ~ r i b e d . ~ ~  Such an enactment 
not only limits the debtor's flexibility, but also restricts the 
debtor's freedom of choice, making the selection process some- 
51. The automobile is a prime example. A number of turn-of-the-century exemption 
statutes excluded wagons, teams, and other horsedrawn vehicles from execution. Follow- 
ing the advent of the automobile some controversy was generated as to whether it should 
fit within the exempt category. Jurisdictions split on whether emphasis should be placed 
on the necessity of the auto in modem life or whether the statutes drafted before the 
invention of the auto should be given a strict construction. For cases exempting automo- 
biles as carriages, buggies, or like vehicles, see Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 F. 65 (8th Cir. 
1914); Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439,234 S.W.2d 410 (1950). For cases taking a more 
literal view, see In re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Posnanovic v. Maki, 
209 Minn. 379, 296 N.W. 415 (1941). 
52. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 511:2 (Supp. 1977). 
53. Mo. ANN. STAT. 4 513.435(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
54. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 4 550.37 (West Supp. 1978)(exempting "all wearing ap- 
parel, one watch, household furniture, utensils, household appliances, phonographs, radio 
and television receivers, and foodstuffs of the debtor and family, not exceeding $3,000 in 
value"). 
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what less than meaningful. 
More favorable legislation would abolish narrow selection 
areas55 and allow the debtor to choose to withdraw from execution 
any of his personalty within a reasonable monetary limit. More- 
over, since a fixed monetary amount is also subject to becoming 
obsolete in inflationary periods, this type of legislation could be 
made more effective by requiring periodic readjustment or by 
tying the monetary limitation to an accurate price indi~ator.~" 
3. Open-ended exemption based on necessity 
A few jurisdictions have passed laws allowing exemption of 
"[all1 implements of husbandry used upon the h~mestead,"~' or 
"[tlhe tools of a mechanic necessary for carrying on his trade."58 
This formulation is very fluid and assures the debtor of needed 
accommodations despite changing circumstances and needs. 
The creditor, however, is placed in the difficult position of 
having his claim compromised by a court decree determining 
which of the debtor's holdings are "reasonably necessary" and 
therefore excluded. Additionally, the determination of what is 
necessary to the debtor is likely to be a source of much litigation 
and the time and cost involved in a case-by-case adjudication of 
"necessity" is burdensome and disadvantageous to both debtor 
and creditor.59 
Lack of uniformity, obsolescence, and poor statutory struc- 
ture are severe weaknesses of the current personal property ex- 
emption scheme. Uniform exemptions legislation is a vehicle by 
which needed changes can be made and innovative exemption 
policy established. 
The Uniform Exemptions Act (UEA) is a concerted attempt 
to rectify the faults that undeniably exist in many state exemp- 
tion schemes. I t  proposes a single system of exemptions applica- 
ble to all debtors. In considering the UEA's application to per- 
55. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1 (Bums Supp. 1977) (area of selection in- 
cludes real estate, "tangible personal property," and "intangible personal property"). 
56. Adjustment of dollar amounts as provided for in § 1.106 of the UNIFORM CONSUMER 
CREDIT CODE is also recommended by the UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS Am § 2. 
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, 8 l(4) (West Supp. 1977). 
58. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1 (1972). 
59. Litigation over what is necessary may be, however, a necessary evil especially if 
the delicate balance between debtor's and creditor's interests involved in the administra- 
tion of exemption law is to be adequately considered. 
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sonal property law it will be helpful to review the history, the 
relevant sections, and the advantages and disadvantages of the 
uniform legislation. 
A. History 
Perhaps the most persuasive factor leading the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National 
Conference) to propose the UEA was thg introduction of a bill in 
Congress that would prescribe a single schedule of federal bank- 
ruptcy exemptions? In response to this congressional action, the 
National Conference decided in 1974 to prepare draft uniform 
exemptions legislation. Several drafts were submitted by a spe- 
cial drafting committee during 1974 and 1975, and the final draft 
was "considered, amended, promulgated and recommended to 
the several states for enactmentws1 when the National Conference 
convened at its 1976 annual meeting. Since its promulgation, 
however, no state has enacted the UEA.62 
B. Relevant Sections 
Although the Uniform Exemptions Act covers many areas of 
exemption law, only section 2 (adjustments of dollar amounts), 
section 5 (property exempt without limitation), section 6 (prop- 
erty exempt to extent reasonably necessary for support), and sec- 
tion 8 (exemptions of personal property subject to value limits) 
are directly applicable to personal property exemption law.63 A 
brief summary of these sections will clarify their potential impact 
on the current status of exemption law. 
1. Adjustment of dollar amounts 
Section 2 of the UEA, patterned after section 1.106 of the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, requires that all dollar amounts 
be adjusted by reference to either: (1) the Consumer Price Index 
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: U.S. City Aver- 
age, compiled by the United States Department of Labor Statis- 
tics, (2) a regional consumer price index, or (3) any state statute 
60. UNIFORM EXEMP~ONS Am, Prefatory Note at  7. 
61. Id. at 9. 
62. UNIFORM LAWS ANN., DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM ACTS & TABLES OF ADOPTING 
JURISDI~ONS (master ed. 1978). 
63. These sections are relevant to personal property exemption law even though 8 6 5 
and 7 include as "property" items not generally thought to constitute tangible personalty 
such as veteran's benefits, awards under a crime victim's reparation act, death benefits, 
and unemployment compensation. 
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of general application providing for periodic adjustment of dollar 
amounts by reference to a price or other economic index." This 
section is one of the most innovative and useful provisions of the 
Act and introduces a simple but effective answer to the very real 
problem of coping with the "ravages of economic . . . changesMfi5 
that have plagued state exemption statutes for too many years. 
2. Property exemption without limitation 
The provisions of section 5 grant absolute exemption status 
to two classifications of tangible personal property. Subsection 
(1) exempts "a burial plot for the individual and his family" and 
subsection (2) excludes from execution "health aides reasonably 
necessary to enable the individual or a dependent to work or to 
sustain health." These provisions are somewhat similar to spe- 
cific enumeration statutes but avoid the obsolescence problem 
because they represent a narrow group of items that are of un- 
changing necessity. 
3. Property exempt to extent reasonably necessary for support 
Although section 6(a) enumerates certain monetary benefits 
and awards not commonly thought of as personalty, the relevant 
core of this section exempts from execution the property 
"required to meet the present and anticipated needs of the indi- 
vidual and his  dependent^."^^ The determination of what consti- 
tutes property necessary for support is made by the court "after 
consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the pres- 
ent and anticipated property and income of the indi~idual."~' 
This section incorporates, therefore, many of the desirable fea- 
tures of open-ended statutes while wisely giving the court some 
factors to analyze in weighing what is "necessary." 
4. Exemptions of personal property subject to value limitations 
The items enumerated under section 8 closely resemble and 
are fairly typical of existing state statutes allowing restricted 
selection from specified categories of personalty. Subsection (a) 
allows an exemption of up to $500 for each item of property con- 
stituting: (1) household furnishings and appliances found to be 
reasonably necessary; (2) wearing apparel, animals, books, and 
64. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT fj 2(a), Comments (2) and (3). 
65. Id., Prefatory Note at 10. 
66. Id. fj 6(b). 
67. Id. 
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musical instruments reasonably held for personal use of the indi- 
vidual and his family; and (3) family portraits and heirlooms of 
particular sentimental value to the individual. Subsection (b) 
exempts up to $750 of jewelry if "held for the personal use of an 
individual or a dependent." Subsection (c) excludes from execu- 
tion an aggregate value of $1,000 in "implements, professional 
books, and tools of the trade" and in addition "an exemption of 
one motor vehicle . . . of a value not exceeding $1,500." Finally, 
subsection (d) provides, in addition to any other exemption, an 
exemption of cash and other "liquid assets" (deposits, securities, 
notes, drafts, accrued vacation pay, refunds, and other receiv- 
ables) of $500 if the individual claims a homestead or $1,500 if 
he does not? Section 8, like many state statutes, restricts the 
property exempted to set dollar amounts, but unlike most state 
statutes, permits the debtor to select that property from a rather 
broad classification range. More importantly, the section side- 
steps the problem of crystallization of the dollar limits because 
section 2 requires periodic adjustment of all dollar amounts. 
C. Evaluation of the Uniform Exemptions Act 
1. Advantages 
The Uniform Exemptions Act incorporates many important 
features that should be carefully considered by states contem- 
plating its adoption. The greatest advantages of the UEA are 
those inherent in a uniform exemption system. Uniformity will 
guarantee certainty of procedure. Both the debtor and the credi- 
tor will benefit from knowing the type and value of exempt items 
and will be able to conduct their credit relationships accordingly. 
Importantly, a well-drafted uniform system will eliminate the 
diversity and flaws that have stemmed from the perpetuation of 
outmoded and poorly structured state statutes. 
Another attractive feature of the UEA is its general conform- 
ity to the policy of the proposed Bankruptcy Act?' This conform- 
ity is made all the more appealing by the fact that a bankruptcy 
proposal prescribing a uniform exemption has recently passed the 
House of  representative^.'^ 
One of the most needed and desirable innovations made by 
the Act is the adjustment of dollar amounts through a tie-in to a 
68. Id. 9 8(a)-(d). 
69. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
70. H.R. 8200 was passed by a voice vote on Feb. 1, 1978 and referred to the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary. 124 CONG. REC. H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978). 
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reliable price indicator. This provision introduces an easily ad- 
ministered and effective means of dealing with the old problem 
of dollar-limit obsolescence. 
Several advantages also accrue through the operation of the 
recommended uniform schedule of exemptions. One of these ad- 
vantages is that any exemption subject to the debtor's selection 
must meet a standard of reasonable necessity. The operation of 
this requirement could well act to negate compulsive and unwise 
selection by the debtor of items that may prove to be unnecessary 
and thus hinder the rehabilitation of the debtor's obligations. In 
addition, the UEA gives some direction in determining 
"necessity" to the court by requiring "consideration of the indi- 
vidual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated prop- 
erty and income of the individual, including that which is ex- 
empt. "71 
The official comment following section 8 of the UEA indi- 
cates that another advantage in the operation of the Act is that 
the value limitation of $500 per item contained in that section will 
significantly reduce the administrative time and cost involved in 
obtaining an appraisal of all the personal property claimed by the 
debtor. This advantage will result because "most individuals do 
not have any property within the listed categories having a value 
close enough to the statutory maximum [of $5001 to warrant 
appraisal. "72 
As is apparent, the draftsmen of the UEA have merged the 
most popular aspects of current exemption structure, including 
the absolute exemption of necessary items, restricted selection 
from specified categories, and open-ended exemption based on 
necessity. Significantly, this feat was accomplished without pig- 
gybacking a number of the undesirable features of the named 
structural modes. 
2. Disadvantages 
Notwithstanding its many positive aspects, the Uniform 
Exemptions Act is not free from blemish and in examining its 
provisions certain disadvantages should be considered. The pri- 
mary contention against the uniform act is an argument against 
the very concept of a uniform system. Even though nonuniformity 
may cause confusion and lead to the application of different stan- 
dards among the several states, it is arguable that exemption 
71. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACI' 8 6(b). 
72. Id. 8 8, Comment (2). 
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statutes are not the type of legislation that can best be regulated 
through a uniform national system.73 On the contrary, local con- 
concerns might so outweigh the desire for uniformity that the di- 
versity of exemption law a t  the state level is not merely justifi- 
able, but actually necessary. Even the National Conference rec- 
ognized the strength of this argument. 
Some variation in the exemptions provided by state law 
may be sought to be justified as related to different standards, 
costs, and modes of life that prevail in the different states. To 
the extent that the justification has validity, it affords warrant 
for variations in allowable exemptions within state boundaries 
. . . .  
74 
A second area of concern centers around the rejection by the 
National Conference of the view that every debtor should be enti- 
tled to a "minimum grub~take ."~~ A few commentators have ad- 
vocated that the best exemption policy would grant such a single 
cash a l l o ~ a n c e . ~ ~  It can also be argued that failure to grant this 
minimum allowance in addition to exemption rights may work a 
hardship on the poor or uninformed who may not, through the 
exercise of personalty exemptions, be able to salvage all of their 
actual necessities without a minimum grubstake. 
A practical problem in the application of the UEA is the 
adjudication of what is meant by "necessary for support." Even 
though courts are given a definition of necessity and other defini- 
tional guidelines, this provision will mandate the cost and delay 
inherent in case-by-case determinations. 
Another practical problem is that the UEA, like current ex- 
emption statutes, fails to take into account many intangibles that 
are superimposed on debtor-creditor relationships. Consideration 
of these intangibles is the most vexing problem in the drafting of 
effective exemption legislation, because the written word of a 
statute cannot always balance the competing interests of the 
debtor and creditor in the individual case. A few of the host of 
intangible factors that should be considered are: (1) whether the 
debt judgment was founded in tort or ~ontrac t ,~ '  (2) whether the 
73. As early as 1851 the Supreme Court recognized that some fields of commerce were 
so fraught with local concerns that uniform national regulation was impractical. See 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
74. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS Am, Prefatory Note at 8. 
75. Id. at 9. 
76. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 
CORNELL . REV. 663, 671 (1968); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and 
Suggestions, YALE L.J. 1459, 1507 (1959). 
77. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra. 
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debtor can obtain support from his family, (3) whether the non- 
payment of the debt was caused by improvidence or as a result 
of medical or other unforeseen expenses, (4) whether the debtor 
is also in possession of real property, and (5) whether the relative 
welfare of the debtor vis-a-vis the creditor demands special treat- 
ment.78 
The constitutionality of uniform exemption legislation, the 
effect of which would modify existing practices and policies, is 
another potential weakness. Such midstream alterations may re- 
sult in constitutional challenges based on the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment and the provision against impair- 
ment of contracts found in article one, section ten of the Constitu- 
tion. Debtors and creditors have both, on occasion, claimed a 
vested interest in exemption statutes and argued that increasing 
or decreasing the allotted exemption constitutes a violation of due 
process.79 It is conceivable that enactment of the UEA would 
trigger similar claims based on the due process clause. 
Article one, section ten of the Constitution provides that no 
state shall pass any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 
Originally, the Supreme Court closely scrutinized the effects of 
alterations in exemption law,80 invalidating all such changes 
where "the law which prevailed when the contract was made has 
been so far changed that there does not remain a substantial and 
reasonable mode of enforcing it in the ordinary and regular course 
of 
With the passage of time, however, the strict scrutiny re- 
quired by early Supreme Court interpretations of the contract 
clause has gradually been eroded by exceptions," and in later 
opinions the contract clause has been construed so as not to over- 
ride valid exercises of the states' police power.83 But notwith- 
78. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra. 
79. Cases in which debtor claims vested right: Petrulionis v. Dudek, 113 Ill. App. 2d 
398, 401-02, 252 N.E.2d 23,25 (1969); Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N.Y. 358,373,94 N.E. 
1001, 1006 (1911); Majors v. Carter, 175 Tenn. 450, 453, 135 S.W.2d 924, 925 (1940). Case 
in which creditor claims such a right: Hooter v. Wilson, 256 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App. 1972), 
rev 'd, 273 So. 2d 516 (La. 1973). 
80. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877). 
81. Id. at 611-12 (Hunt, J., concurring). 
82. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 
(1914); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905). 
83. The contract clause, if interpreted as precluding any state legislative action im- 
pinging on contractual rights, has the capacity to stifle a state's exercise of police power. 
Likewise, the police powers, if interpreted to its broadest limits, has an equal capacity to 
render the contract clause ineffectual. In both Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 
232 U.S. 48 (1914) and Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the 
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standing its declining impact, the contract clause may have been 
imbued with new life by United States Trust Co. v.  New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  
a recent Supreme Court decision. United States Trust Co. re- 
versed the trend of recent years and for the first time in nearly 
four decades invalidated a state law as violative of the contract 
clause. Although the case involved impairment of state rather 
than private  contract^,^^ the decision may have future application 
to exemption law. 
But, although blemished, the UEA does not appear to be 
fatally flawed. For example, even though due process arguments 
may be leveled a t  the Act, these contentions become somewhat 
dubious when one realizes that courts have been very hesitant to 
find that a vested right exists in exemption statutes. Moreover, 
although the United States Trust Co. case has apparently revital- 
ized the contract clause, the rationale of the case may not apply 
to the alteration of private as compared to state  contract^.^" 
As for other weaknesses of the Act, the fact that the 
"necessity" of certain exemptions must be adjudicated does not, 
of itself, render the UEA undesirable. Not only does the Act give 
definitional guidelines, but through the implementation of inno- 
vative judicial techniques the burden of case-by-case adjudica- 
tion can be lessened? Furthermore, the advantages of a uniform 
system-continuity of procedure, free flow of interstate credit, 
and certainty of application-all strongly favor the UEA. There- 
fore, despite its flaws, the UEA still stands as a well-worded and 
carefully researched proposal which, with appropriate modifica- 
Court has issued broad statements that tend to subjugate the contract clause to the valid 
exercise of the police power. In Goldsboro the Court declared, 
[I]t is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause 
has the effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulat'ions that 
are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or 
general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor 
bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract 
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. 
232 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added). See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. at 429-30. 
84. 431 US. 1 (1977). 
85. The suit involved the 1974 repeal of a 1962 statutory covenant between New York 
and New Jersey that limited the ability of the New York Port Authority to subsidize rail 
passenger transportation from certain bond revenues and reserves. Mr. Justice Black- 
mun's opinion indicated that a state that has enacted a law impairing its own rather than 
a private obligation must meet a strict scrutiny standard-the enactment must be shown 
to be both "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose" in order to 
pass muster under the contract clause. Id. at  25. 
. 86 . Id .  
87. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infnr. 
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tions and following careful study, should be implemented by all 
states. 
D. Possible Modification of the UEA 
The following represent a few of the modifications a ratifying 
state may incorporate into the UEA to make it a more effective 
piece of legislation. These modifications would help the ratifying 
state cope with two areas that loom as potential trouble spots in 
the Act-providing a "minimum grubstake," and balancing the 
competing interests of debtor and creditor. 
1.  Guaranteed minimum exemption 
In addition to exemptions granted by the UEA, a state 
adopting the Act could also guarantee a minimum exemption.88 
This modification could be accomplished by expanding the num- 
ber of items awarded absolute exemption. Such items as family 
books and pictures, all wearing apparel, a television or radio re- 
ceiver, ordinary kitchen utensils and place settings, and one 
year's supply of provisions and fuel could be added. Another ap- 
proach would be to determine a set monetary allowance, such as 
$1,000, which would be absolutely exempt from execution. The 
figure would have to be made subject to mandatory adjustment 
either by frequent legislative review or by a tie-in to a reliable 
price index. 
2. Innovative judicial administration 
In order to effectively balance the interests involved in 
debtor-creditor relationships and to adequately determine what 
constitutes "reasonable necessity" under the Act, the adopting 
state could incorporate one of a number of developing judicial 
administrative techniques. The practices best suited to meet the 
needs of exemption law are supplementary proceedings and the 
neighborhood court system. 
a. Supplementary proceedings. Once a claim has been filed 
and an exemption exercised, a state could provide for a supple- 
mentary proceeding a t  the election of either the debtor or creditor 
in which the legal ritual and evidentiary requirements would be 
relaxed. The arbiter would be given broad discretion in such pro- 
ceedings to weigh the underlying factors in making a fair decision. 
88. A set minimum exemption would have the advantage of guaranteeing the debtor's 
subsistence without the need for a judicial determination. 
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Despite procedural difficulties, meager court facilities, and en- 
forcement problems, in 1935 New York had limited success with 
its supplementary  proceeding^.^^ It is feasible that such an action 
could have application to uniform exemption law. 
b.  Neighborhood court system. An even more novel ap- 
proach to judicial administration of exemption law has been sug- 
gested by Edgar and Jean Cahn, who advocate a neighborhood 
court system.90 Cahn and Cahn state: 
There is a clear need for the creation, on a neighborhood 
level, of mechanisms for settling disputes, dispensing remedies 
and enunciating norms of conduct. Those needs cannot be dealt 
with by any single means. Some conflicts can best be resolved 
by adjudication; others can be amicably settled by mutual con- 
sent; still others are pseudo-conflicts based on false assumptions 
or lack of knowledge about alternatives, resources and sources 
of assistance. 
We believe that a neighborhood court system so constructed 
as to utilize a variety of approaches to conflict resolution would 
make a substantial contribution to the rule of law, and would 
constitute a tangible and significant response to the demand for 
a share, a voice, and a role in the new dispensation of justi~e.~'  
In their observations, the Cahns recognize inherent problems in 
the administration and enforcement of a quasi-judicial neighbor- 
hood court system, but  i t  is conceivable that these problems 
could be alleviated and a neighborhood proceeding used to make 
exemption law a better vehicle for balancing the conflicting needs 
of the debtor and creditor. 
Both the neighborhood court system and supplementary pro- 
ceedings could be incorporated into the UEA system as elective 
provisions and could be used either as an alternative to a formal 
levy and execution action or as an additional factfinding hearing. 
The eligibility requirements for these provisions should be left to 
the adopting state, but may include minimum and maximum 
debt and exemption limits, a showing that the party is entering 
with clean hands, or a minimum bond requirement to insure that 
the proceedings are held in good faith. A less formal atmosphere 
would prevail at  these proceedings and the parties would be en- 
89. See generally Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments: Experimentation with 
Supplementary Proceedings, 36 COLUM. L  REV. 1061 (1936); Cohen, Collection cf Money 
Judgments in New York: Supplementary Proceedings, 35 COLUM. L  REV. 1007 (1935). 
90. See generally Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective 
Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927, 950-60 (1966). 
91. Id. at 950. 
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couraged, through the mediation of an arbiter, to resolve their 
conflicts and arrive a t  an equitable plan of restitution or partial 
repayment. Ideally, the resolution will take into account the 
unique factual underpinnings of the conflict and will do so with- 
out favoring the debtor or burdening the creditor. The decision 
of the arbiter would be judicially reviewable upon a showing of 
fraud, misrepresentation, or other indicia of bad faith. 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, state 
personal property exemption law has evolved under the auspices 
of the individual state legislatures. For nearly a quarter of a cen- 
tury, commentators and observers have decried the resulting lack 
of uniformity, along with the gross obsolescence and faulty statu- 
tory structure, of state exemption laws. After carefully studying 
the evolution and current status of state exemption statutes, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
decided in 1974 that uniform legislation was overdue and in 1976 
promulgated the Uniform Exemptions Act. Since the UEA has 
been successful in overcoming many of the flaws present in exist- 
ing state personal property exemption statutes, the UEA, modi- 
fied by innovative judicial administration techniques, is the best 
way to effectuate the purposes of exemption law and balance the 
competing interests of the debtor and creditor. 
Richard L. Christenson 
